Analyzing MFT for Deleted File Recovery
Overview
The NTFS Master File Table ($MFT) is the central metadata repository for every file and directory on an NTFS volume. Each file is represented by at least one 1024-byte MFT record containing attributes such as $STANDARD_INFORMATION (timestamps, permissions), $FILE_NAME (name, parent directory, timestamps), and $DATA (file content or cluster run pointers). When a file is deleted, its MFT record is marked as inactive (InUse flag cleared) but the metadata remains until the entry is reallocated by a new file. This persistence makes MFT analysis a primary technique for recovering deleted file evidence, reconstructing file system timelines, and detecting anti-forensic activity such as timestomping.
Prerequisites
- Forensic disk image (E01, raw/dd, VMDK, or VHDX format)
- MFTECmd (Eric Zimmerman) or analyzeMFT (Python-based)
- FTK Imager, Arsenal Image Mounter, or similar for image mounting
- Timeline Explorer or Excel for CSV analysis
- Python 3.8+ for custom analysis scripts
- Understanding of NTFS file system internals
MFT Structure and Record Layout
MFT Record Header
Each MFT record begins with the signature "FILE" (0x46494C45) and contains:
| Offset | Size | Field |
|---|---|---|
| 0x00 | 4 bytes | Signature ("FILE") |
| 0x04 | 2 bytes | Offset to update sequence |
| 0x06 | 2 bytes | Size of update sequence |
| 0x08 | 8 bytes | $LogFile sequence number |
| 0x10 | 2 bytes | Sequence number |
| 0x12 | 2 bytes | Hard link count |
| 0x14 | 2 bytes | Offset to first attribute |
| 0x16 | 2 bytes | Flags (0x01 = InUse, 0x02 = Directory) |
| 0x18 | 4 bytes | Used size of MFT record |
| 0x1C | 4 bytes | Allocated size of MFT record |
| 0x20 | 8 bytes | Base file record reference |
| 0x28 | 2 bytes | Next attribute ID |
Key MFT Attributes
| Type ID | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| 0x10 | $STANDARD_INFORMATION | Timestamps, flags, owner ID, security ID |
| 0x30 | $FILE_NAME | Filename, parent MFT reference, timestamps |
| 0x40 | $OBJECT_ID | Unique GUID for the file |
| 0x50 | $SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR | ACL permissions |
| 0x60 | $VOLUME_NAME | Volume label (volume metadata files only) |
| 0x80 | $DATA | File content (resident if <700 bytes) or cluster run list |
| 0x90 | $INDEX_ROOT | B-tree index root for directories |
| 0xA0 | $INDEX_ALLOCATION | B-tree index entries for large directories |
| 0xB0 | $BITMAP | Allocation bitmap for index or MFT |
Deleted File Recovery Techniques
Technique 1: MFT Record Analysis with MFTECmd
# Extract $MFT from forensic image using KAPE or FTK Imager
# Parse the $MFT with MFTECmd
MFTECmd.exe -f "C:\Evidence\$MFT" --csv C:\Output --csvf mft_full.csv
# Filter for deleted files (InUse = FALSE) in Timeline Explorer
# Look for entries where InUse column is False
Identifying Deleted Files in CSV Output:
InUse= False indicates a deleted or reallocated recordParentPathshows original file location before deletionFileSizeshows the original size (may still be recoverable)- Timestamps in
$STANDARD_INFORMATIONand$FILE_NAMEattributes persist
Technique 2: USN Journal ($UsnJrnl:$J) Analysis
The USN Journal records all changes to files on an NTFS volume, including creation, deletion, rename, and data modification events.
# Parse USN Journal with MFTECmd
MFTECmd.exe -f "C:\Evidence\$J" --csv C:\Output --csvf usn_journal.csv
# Key USN reason codes for deletion evidence:
# USN_REASON_FILE_DELETE = 0x00000200
# USN_REASON_CLOSE = 0x80000000
# USN_REASON_RENAME_OLD_NAME = 0x00001000
# USN_REASON_RENAME_NEW_NAME = 0x00002000
Technique 3: $LogFile Transaction Analysis
The $LogFile stores NTFS transaction records that can reveal file operations even after the USN Journal has been cycled.
# Parse $LogFile with LogFileParser
LogFileParser.exe -l "C:\Evidence\$LogFile" -o C:\Output
# Look for REDO and UNDO operations indicating file deletion:
# - DeallocateFileRecordSegment
# - DeleteAttribute
# - UpdateResidentValue (clearing InUse flag)
Technique 4: MFT Slack Space Analysis
MFT slack space exists between the end of the used portion of an MFT record and the end of the allocated 1024 bytes. This area may contain remnants of previous file records.
import struct
def parse_mft_slack(mft_path: str, output_path: str):
"""Extract and analyze MFT slack space for deleted file remnants."""
with open(mft_path, "rb") as f:
record_size = 1024
record_num = 0
slack_findings = []
while True:
record = f.read(record_size)
if len(record) < record_size:
break
# Verify FILE signature
if record[:4] != b"FILE":
record_num += 1
continue
# Get used size from offset 0x18
used_size = struct.unpack("<I", record[0x18:0x1C])[0]
if used_size < record_size:
slack = record[used_size:]
# Check if slack contains readable strings or attribute headers
if any(c > 0x20 and c < 0x7F for c in slack[:50]):
slack_findings.append({
"record": record_num,
"used_size": used_size,
"slack_size": record_size - used_size,
"slack_preview": slack[:100].hex()
})
record_num += 1
return slack_findings
Correlation with Supporting Artifacts
Cross-Reference MFT with $Recycle.Bin
# Parse Recycle Bin with RBCmd
RBCmd.exe -d "C:\Evidence\$Recycle.Bin" --csv C:\Output --csvf recycle_bin.csv
# Correlate: $I files contain original path and deletion timestamp
# Match MFT entry numbers from $R files back to original MFT records
Cross-Reference MFT with Volume Shadow Copies
# List volume shadow copies
vssadmin list shadows
# Mount shadow copies and extract $MFT from each
# Compare MFT records across shadow copies to track file changes over time
Forensic Value
- Deleted file metadata recovery: Original filename, path, size, and timestamps
- Timeline reconstruction: File creation, modification, access, and deletion events
- Timestomping detection: Comparing $SI vs $FN timestamps
- Data carving guidance: MFT cluster runs point to file content on disk
- Anti-forensic detection: Identifying wiped or manipulated MFT records
Verification Criteria
Confirm successful execution by validating:
- [ ] All prerequisite tools and access requirements are satisfied
- [ ] Each workflow step completed without errors
- [ ] Output matches expected format and contains expected data
- [ ] No security warnings or misconfigurations detected
- [ ] Results are documented and evidence is preserved for audit
Compliance Framework Mapping
This skill supports compliance evidence collection across multiple frameworks:
- SOC 2: CC7.3 (Incident Identification), CC7.4 (Incident Response)
- ISO 27001: A.16.1 (Security Incident Management), A.12.4 (Logging)
- NIST 800-53: AU-6 (Audit Review), IR-4 (Incident Handling), AU-9 (Audit Protection)
- NIST CSF: RS.AN (Analysis), RS.RP (Response Planning)
Claw GRC Tip: When this skill is executed by a registered agent, compliance evidence is automatically captured and mapped to the relevant controls in your active frameworks.
Deploying This Skill with Claw GRC
Agent Execution
Register this skill with your Claw GRC agent for automated execution:
# Install via CLI
npx claw-grc skills add analyzing-mft-for-deleted-file-recovery
# Or load dynamically via MCP
grc.load_skill("analyzing-mft-for-deleted-file-recovery")
Audit Trail Integration
When executed through Claw GRC, every step of this skill generates tamper-evident audit records:
- SHA-256 chain hashing ensures no step can be modified after execution
- Evidence artifacts (configs, scan results, logs) are automatically attached to relevant controls
- Trust score impact — successful execution increases your agent's trust score
Continuous Compliance
Schedule this skill for recurring execution to maintain continuous compliance posture. Claw GRC monitors for drift and alerts when re-execution is needed.
References
- NTFS MFT Advanced Forensic Analysis: https://www.deaddisk.com/posts/ntfs-mft-advanced-forensic-analysis-guide/
- MFT Slack Space Forensic Value: https://www.sygnia.co/blog/the-forensic-value-of-mft-slack-space/
- MFTECmd Documentation: https://ericzimmerman.github.io/
- SANS FOR500: Windows Forensic Analysis