Hardening Docker Daemon Configuration
Overview
The Docker daemon (dockerd) runs with root privileges and controls all container operations. Hardening its configuration through /etc/docker/daemon.json, TLS certificates, user namespace remapping, and network restrictions is essential to prevent privilege escalation, lateral movement, and container breakout attacks.
Prerequisites
- Docker Engine 24.0+ installed
- Root or sudo access to the Docker host
- OpenSSL for TLS certificate generation
- Understanding of Linux namespaces and cgroups
Core Hardened daemon.json
{
"icc": false,
"userns-remap": "default",
"no-new-privileges": true,
"log-driver": "json-file",
"log-opts": {
"max-size": "10m",
"max-file": "5"
},
"storage-driver": "overlay2",
"live-restore": true,
"userland-proxy": false,
"default-ulimits": {
"nofile": {
"Name": "nofile",
"Hard": 65536,
"Soft": 32768
},
"nproc": {
"Name": "nproc",
"Hard": 4096,
"Soft": 2048
}
},
"seccomp-profile": "/etc/docker/seccomp/default.json",
"default-address-pools": [
{
"base": "172.17.0.0/16",
"size": 24
}
],
"iptables": true,
"ip-forward": true,
"ip-masq": true,
"experimental": false,
"metrics-addr": "127.0.0.1:9323",
"max-concurrent-downloads": 3,
"max-concurrent-uploads": 5,
"default-runtime": "runc",
"runtimes": {
"runsc": {
"path": "/usr/local/bin/runsc",
"runtimeArgs": ["--platform=ptrace"]
}
}
}
Setting-by-Setting Explanation
Disable Inter-Container Communication (ICC)
{
"icc": false
}
Prevents containers on the default bridge network from communicating. Each container must use explicit --link or user-defined networks with published ports.
Enable User Namespace Remapping
{
"userns-remap": "default"
}
Maps container root (UID 0) to a high unprivileged UID on the host. This prevents a container breakout from gaining root on the host.
# Verify userns-remap is active
cat /etc/subuid
# Output: dockremap:100000:65536
cat /etc/subgid
# Output: dockremap:100000:65536
# Verify container UID mapping
docker run --rm alpine id
# uid=0(root) gid=0(root) -- but host UID is 100000+
Disable New Privilege Escalation
{
"no-new-privileges": true
}
Prevents container processes from gaining additional privileges via setuid/setgid binaries or capability escalation.
Enable Live Restore
{
"live-restore": true
}
Keeps containers running during daemon downtime, enabling daemon upgrades without container restart.
Disable Userland Proxy
{
"userland-proxy": false
}
Uses iptables rules instead of docker-proxy for port forwarding, reducing attack surface and improving performance.
TLS Configuration for Remote Docker API
Generate CA and Server Certificates
# Create CA
openssl genrsa -aes256 -out ca-key.pem 4096
openssl req -new -x509 -days 365 -key ca-key.pem -sha256 -out ca.pem \
-subj "/CN=Docker CA"
# Create server key and CSR
openssl genrsa -out server-key.pem 4096
openssl req -subj "/CN=docker-host" -sha256 -new -key server-key.pem -out server.csr
# Create extfile with SANs
echo "subjectAltName = DNS:docker-host,IP:10.0.0.5,IP:127.0.0.1" > extfile.cnf
echo "extendedKeyUsage = serverAuth" >> extfile.cnf
# Sign server certificate
openssl x509 -req -days 365 -sha256 -in server.csr -CA ca.pem -CAkey ca-key.pem \
-CAcreateserial -out server-cert.pem -extfile extfile.cnf
# Create client key and certificate
openssl genrsa -out key.pem 4096
openssl req -subj "/CN=client" -new -key key.pem -out client.csr
echo "extendedKeyUsage = clientAuth" > extfile-client.cnf
openssl x509 -req -days 365 -sha256 -in client.csr -CA ca.pem -CAkey ca-key.pem \
-CAcreateserial -out cert.pem -extfile extfile-client.cnf
# Set permissions
chmod 0400 ca-key.pem key.pem server-key.pem
chmod 0444 ca.pem server-cert.pem cert.pem
# Move to Docker TLS directory
sudo mkdir -p /etc/docker/tls
sudo cp ca.pem server-cert.pem server-key.pem /etc/docker/tls/
Configure daemon.json for TLS
{
"tls": true,
"tlsverify": true,
"tlscacert": "/etc/docker/tls/ca.pem",
"tlscert": "/etc/docker/tls/server-cert.pem",
"tlskey": "/etc/docker/tls/server-key.pem",
"hosts": ["unix:///var/run/docker.sock", "tcp://0.0.0.0:2376"]
}
Client Connection
docker --tlsverify \
--tlscacert=ca.pem \
--tlscert=cert.pem \
--tlskey=key.pem \
-H=tcp://docker-host:2376 version
Docker Socket Protection
# Restrict socket ownership
sudo chown root:docker /var/run/docker.sock
sudo chmod 660 /var/run/docker.sock
# Audit Docker socket access
sudo auditctl -w /var/run/docker.sock -k docker-socket
# Never mount Docker socket into containers
# BAD: docker run -v /var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock ...
Rootless Docker
# Install rootless Docker
curl -fsSL https://get.docker.com/rootless | sh
# Configure environment
export PATH=$HOME/bin:$PATH
export DOCKER_HOST=unix://$XDG_RUNTIME_DIR/docker.sock
# Start rootless daemon
systemctl --user start docker
systemctl --user enable docker
# Verify rootless mode
docker info | grep -i rootless
# Rootless: true
Content Trust (Image Signing)
# Enable Docker Content Trust
export DOCKER_CONTENT_TRUST=1
# Pull only signed images
docker pull library/alpine:3.18
# Will fail if image is not signed
# Sign and push image
docker trust sign myregistry/myapp:1.0
Seccomp Profile
# View default seccomp profile
docker info --format '{{.SecurityOptions}}'
# Use custom seccomp profile
docker run --security-opt seccomp=/etc/docker/seccomp/custom.json alpine
# Verify seccomp is enabled
docker inspect --format='{{.HostConfig.SecurityOpt}}' container_name
AppArmor Profile
# Check AppArmor status
sudo aa-status
# Use custom AppArmor profile
docker run --security-opt apparmor=docker-custom alpine
# Load custom profile
sudo apparmor_parser -r /etc/apparmor.d/docker-custom
Verification Commands
# Check daemon configuration
docker info
# Verify userns-remap
docker info --format '{{.SecurityOptions}}'
# Check ICC setting
docker network inspect bridge --format '{{.Options}}'
# Audit with Docker Bench
docker run --rm --net host --pid host \
-v /var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock \
-v /etc:/etc:ro \
docker/docker-bench-security
Best Practices
- Never expose Docker daemon without TLS - Always use
--tlsverifyfor remote access - Enable user namespace remapping - Map container root to unprivileged host UID
- Disable ICC - Prevent default bridge network container-to-container communication
- Use rootless mode - Run Docker daemon as non-root where possible
- Enable content trust - Only pull signed images
- Configure log rotation - Prevent log files from filling disk
- Use seccomp profiles - Restrict syscalls available to containers
- Audit Docker socket - Monitor access to /var/run/docker.sock
- Run Docker Bench regularly - Automate CIS benchmark checks
- Keep Docker updated - Apply security patches promptly
Compliance Framework Mapping
This skill supports compliance evidence collection across multiple frameworks:
- SOC 2: CC6.1 (Logical Access), CC7.1 (Monitoring), CC8.1 (Change Management)
- ISO 27001: A.14.2 (Secure Development), A.12.6 (Technical Vulnerability Mgmt)
- NIST 800-53: CM-7 (Least Functionality), SI-2 (Flaw Remediation), SC-28 (Protection at Rest)
- NIST CSF: PR.IP (Information Protection), PR.DS (Data Security)
Claw GRC Tip: When this skill is executed by a registered agent, compliance evidence is automatically captured and mapped to the relevant controls in your active frameworks.
Deploying This Skill with Claw GRC
Agent Execution
Register this skill with your Claw GRC agent for automated execution:
# Install via CLI
npx claw-grc skills add hardening-docker-daemon-configuration
# Or load dynamically via MCP
grc.load_skill("hardening-docker-daemon-configuration")
Audit Trail Integration
When executed through Claw GRC, every step of this skill generates tamper-evident audit records:
- SHA-256 chain hashing ensures no step can be modified after execution
- Evidence artifacts (configs, scan results, logs) are automatically attached to relevant controls
- Trust score impact — successful execution increases your agent's trust score
Continuous Compliance
Schedule this skill for recurring execution to maintain continuous compliance posture. Claw GRC monitors for drift and alerts when re-execution is needed.