Performing Malware Persistence Investigation
When to Use
- When investigating how malware maintains presence on a compromised system after reboots
- During incident response to identify all persistence mechanisms for complete remediation
- For threat hunting to discover unauthorized autostart entries across endpoints
- When analyzing malware behavior to understand its persistence strategy
- For verifying that all persistence has been removed after incident remediation
Prerequisites
- Forensic image or live system access with administrative privileges
- Autoruns (Sysinternals) for Windows persistence enumeration
- RegRipper for offline registry analysis
- Understanding of Windows and Linux persistence mechanisms
- YARA rules for scanning persistence locations
- Baseline of known-good autorun entries for comparison
Workflow
Step 1: Enumerate Windows Registry Persistence
# Extract registry hives from forensic image
mount -o ro,loop,offset=$((2048*512)) /cases/case-2024-001/images/evidence.dd /mnt/evidence
# Key registry persistence locations
python3 << 'PYEOF'
from Registry import Registry
import json
results = {'registry_persistence': []}
# SYSTEM hive analysis
system_reg = Registry.Registry("/cases/case-2024-001/registry/SYSTEM")
select = system_reg.open("Select")
current = select.value("Current").value()
cs = f"ControlSet{current:03d}"
# Services (very common persistence)
services = system_reg.open(f"{cs}\\Services")
for svc in services.subkeys():
try:
start_type = svc.value("Start").value()
image_path = ""
try:
image_path = svc.value("ImagePath").value()
except:
pass
# Start types: 0=Boot, 1=System, 2=Auto, 3=Manual, 4=Disabled
if start_type in (0, 1, 2) and image_path:
svc_type = svc.value("Type").value() if svc.values() else 0
results['registry_persistence'].append({
'location': f'HKLM\\SYSTEM\\{cs}\\Services\\{svc.name()}',
'type': 'Service',
'value': image_path,
'start_type': start_type,
'timestamp': str(svc.timestamp())
})
except Exception:
pass
# SOFTWARE hive analysis
sw_reg = Registry.Registry("/cases/case-2024-001/registry/SOFTWARE")
# Machine Run keys
run_keys = [
"Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run",
"Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnce",
"Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunServices",
"Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunServicesOnce",
"Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\Explorer\\Run",
"Wow6432Node\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run",
"Wow6432Node\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnce",
]
for key_path in run_keys:
try:
key = sw_reg.open(key_path)
for value in key.values():
results['registry_persistence'].append({
'location': f'HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\{key_path}',
'type': 'Run Key',
'name': value.name(),
'value': str(value.value()),
'timestamp': str(key.timestamp())
})
except Exception:
pass
# NTUSER.DAT analysis
import glob
for ntuser in glob.glob("/cases/case-2024-001/registry/NTUSER*.DAT"):
try:
user_reg = Registry.Registry(ntuser)
user_run_keys = [
"Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run",
"Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnce",
"Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\Shell Folders\\Startup",
]
for key_path in user_run_keys:
try:
key = user_reg.open(key_path)
for value in key.values():
results['registry_persistence'].append({
'location': f'HKCU\\{key_path}',
'type': 'User Run Key',
'name': value.name(),
'value': str(value.value()),
'timestamp': str(key.timestamp()),
'hive': ntuser
})
except Exception:
pass
except Exception:
pass
print(f"Total registry persistence entries: {len(results['registry_persistence'])}")
for entry in results['registry_persistence']:
print(f" [{entry['type']}] {entry.get('name', '')} -> {entry.get('value', '')[:100]}")
with open('/cases/case-2024-001/analysis/registry_persistence.json', 'w') as f:
json.dump(results, f, indent=2)
PYEOF
Step 2: Check Scheduled Tasks and WMI Persistence
# Extract scheduled tasks from forensic image
mkdir -p /cases/case-2024-001/persistence/tasks/
cp -r /mnt/evidence/Windows/System32/Tasks/* /cases/case-2024-001/persistence/tasks/ 2>/dev/null
# Parse scheduled task XML files
python3 << 'PYEOF'
import os, xml.etree.ElementTree as ET
tasks_dir = '/cases/case-2024-001/persistence/tasks/'
suspicious_tasks = []
for root_dir, dirs, files in os.walk(tasks_dir):
for fname in files:
fpath = os.path.join(root_dir, fname)
try:
tree = ET.parse(fpath)
root = tree.getroot()
ns = {'t': 'http://schemas.microsoft.com/windows/2004/02/mit/task'}
actions = root.findall('.//t:Exec', ns)
for action in actions:
command = action.find('t:Command', ns)
args = action.find('t:Arguments', ns)
cmd_text = command.text if command is not None else ''
args_text = args.text if args is not None else ''
# Flag suspicious commands
suspicious_indicators = [
'powershell', 'cmd.exe', 'wscript', 'cscript', 'mshta',
'regsvr32', 'rundll32', 'certutil', 'bitsadmin',
'/c ', '-enc', '-e ', 'hidden', 'bypass', 'downloadstring',
'invoke-', 'iex', '/tmp/', 'appdata', 'programdata',
'temp\\', '.ps1', '.vbs', '.hta', 'base64'
]
is_suspicious = any(s in (cmd_text + ' ' + args_text).lower() for s in suspicious_indicators)
task_info = {
'name': fname,
'path': fpath.replace(tasks_dir, ''),
'command': cmd_text,
'arguments': args_text,
'suspicious': is_suspicious
}
if is_suspicious:
suspicious_tasks.append(task_info)
print(f"SUSPICIOUS TASK: {fname}")
print(f" Command: {cmd_text}")
print(f" Arguments: {args_text}")
print()
except Exception as e:
pass
print(f"\nTotal suspicious scheduled tasks: {len(suspicious_tasks)}")
PYEOF
# Check WMI event subscriptions (common APT persistence)
# WMI repository: C:\Windows\System32\wbem\Repository\
cp -r /mnt/evidence/Windows/System32/wbem/Repository/ /cases/case-2024-001/persistence/wmi/ 2>/dev/null
# Parse WMI persistence using PyWMIPersistenceFinder
python3 << 'PYEOF'
import os, re
# Search WMI OBJECTS.DATA for event subscriptions
wmi_db = '/cases/case-2024-001/persistence/wmi/OBJECTS.DATA'
if os.path.exists(wmi_db):
with open(wmi_db, 'rb') as f:
data = f.read()
# Search for EventFilter strings
filters = re.findall(b'__EventFilter.*?(?=\x00\x00)', data)
consumers = re.findall(b'CommandLineEventConsumer.*?(?=\x00\x00)', data)
bindings = re.findall(b'__FilterToConsumerBinding.*?(?=\x00\x00)', data)
print("=== WMI PERSISTENCE ===")
print(f"Event Filters: {len(filters)}")
print(f"Command Consumers: {len(consumers)}")
print(f"Filter-Consumer Bindings: {len(bindings)}")
for consumer in consumers:
decoded = consumer.decode('utf-8', errors='ignore')
print(f" Consumer: {decoded[:200]}")
else:
print("WMI repository not found")
PYEOF
Step 3: Check File System and Boot Persistence
# Startup folders
echo "=== STARTUP FOLDER CONTENTS ===" > /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/startup_items.txt
ls -la "/mnt/evidence/ProgramData/Microsoft/Windows/Start Menu/Programs/Startup/" \
>> /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/startup_items.txt 2>/dev/null
for userdir in /mnt/evidence/Users/*/; do
username=$(basename "$userdir")
echo "--- User: $username ---" >> /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/startup_items.txt
ls -la "$userdir/AppData/Roaming/Microsoft/Windows/Start Menu/Programs/Startup/" \
>> /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/startup_items.txt 2>/dev/null
done
# Check DLL search order hijacking locations
echo "=== DLL HIJACKING CHECK ===" > /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/dll_hijack.txt
# Check for DLLs in application directories that should only be in System32
find /mnt/evidence/Program\ Files/ /mnt/evidence/Program\ Files\ \(x86\)/ \
-name "*.dll" -newer /mnt/evidence/Windows/System32/ntdll.dll 2>/dev/null \
>> /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/dll_hijack.txt
# Check for COM object hijacking
python3 << 'PYEOF'
from Registry import Registry
reg = Registry.Registry("/cases/case-2024-001/registry/SOFTWARE")
# Check for suspicious CLSID entries
try:
clsid = reg.open("Classes\\CLSID")
for key in clsid.subkeys():
try:
server = key.subkey("InprocServer32")
dll_path = server.value("(default)").value()
if any(s in dll_path.lower() for s in ['temp', 'appdata', 'programdata', 'downloads', 'tmp']):
print(f"SUSPICIOUS COM: {key.name()} -> {dll_path}")
except:
pass
except:
pass
PYEOF
# Check boot configuration for bootkits
# BCD (Boot Configuration Data)
ls -la /mnt/evidence/Boot/BCD 2>/dev/null
# Check for modified bootmgr or winload.exe
sha256sum /mnt/evidence/Windows/System32/winload.exe 2>/dev/null
Step 4: Check Linux Persistence Mechanisms
# If analyzing a Linux system
LINUX_ROOT="/mnt/evidence"
echo "=== LINUX PERSISTENCE CHECK ===" > /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/linux_persistence.txt
# Cron jobs
echo "--- Cron Jobs ---" >> /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/linux_persistence.txt
cat $LINUX_ROOT/etc/crontab >> /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/linux_persistence.txt 2>/dev/null
ls -la $LINUX_ROOT/etc/cron.d/ >> /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/linux_persistence.txt 2>/dev/null
cat $LINUX_ROOT/etc/cron.d/* >> /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/linux_persistence.txt 2>/dev/null
cat $LINUX_ROOT/var/spool/cron/crontabs/* >> /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/linux_persistence.txt 2>/dev/null
# Systemd services
echo "--- Custom Systemd Services ---" >> /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/linux_persistence.txt
find $LINUX_ROOT/etc/systemd/system/ -name "*.service" -not -type l \
>> /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/linux_persistence.txt 2>/dev/null
# SSH authorized keys
echo "--- SSH Authorized Keys ---" >> /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/linux_persistence.txt
find $LINUX_ROOT/home/ $LINUX_ROOT/root/ -name "authorized_keys" -exec cat {} \; \
>> /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/linux_persistence.txt 2>/dev/null
# Init scripts and rc.local
echo "--- RC Scripts ---" >> /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/linux_persistence.txt
cat $LINUX_ROOT/etc/rc.local >> /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/linux_persistence.txt 2>/dev/null
# Shell profile scripts
echo "--- Profile Scripts ---" >> /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/linux_persistence.txt
cat $LINUX_ROOT/etc/profile.d/*.sh >> /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/linux_persistence.txt 2>/dev/null
# LD_PRELOAD
echo "--- LD_PRELOAD ---" >> /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/linux_persistence.txt
cat $LINUX_ROOT/etc/ld.so.preload >> /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/linux_persistence.txt 2>/dev/null
grep -r "LD_PRELOAD" $LINUX_ROOT/etc/ >> /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/linux_persistence.txt 2>/dev/null
# Kernel modules
echo "--- Loaded Kernel Modules ---" >> /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/linux_persistence.txt
cat $LINUX_ROOT/etc/modules-load.d/*.conf >> /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/linux_persistence.txt 2>/dev/null
# PAM backdoors
echo "--- PAM Configuration ---" >> /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/linux_persistence.txt
find $LINUX_ROOT/etc/pam.d/ -exec grep -l "pam_exec\|pam_script" {} \; \
>> /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/linux_persistence.txt 2>/dev/null
Step 5: Compile Persistence Report
# Generate comprehensive persistence report
python3 << 'PYEOF'
import json
with open('/cases/case-2024-001/analysis/registry_persistence.json') as f:
reg_data = json.load(f)
report = """
MALWARE PERSISTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT
==========================================
PERSISTENCE MECHANISMS FOUND:
1. REGISTRY RUN KEYS:
"""
run_keys = [e for e in reg_data['registry_persistence'] if 'Run' in e.get('type', '')]
for entry in run_keys:
report += f" [{entry['timestamp']}] {entry.get('name', 'N/A')} -> {entry.get('value', '')[:100]}\n"
services = [e for e in reg_data['registry_persistence'] if e.get('type') == 'Service']
report += f"\n2. SERVICES ({len(services)} auto-start services):\n"
for entry in services[:20]:
report += f" {entry['location'].split('\\')[-1]}: {entry['value'][:100]}\n"
report += """
3. SCHEDULED TASKS: [See scheduled_tasks analysis]
4. WMI SUBSCRIPTIONS: [See WMI analysis]
5. STARTUP FOLDER: [See startup_items.txt]
6. COM HIJACKING: [See COM analysis]
SUSPICIOUS ENTRIES REQUIRING INVESTIGATION:
"""
# Flag suspicious entries
for entry in reg_data['registry_persistence']:
value = str(entry.get('value', '')).lower()
suspicious_indicators = ['powershell', 'cmd /c', 'wscript', 'certutil',
'programdata', 'appdata\\local\\temp', 'base64',
'.ps1', '.vbs', '.hta', '/tmp/', 'hidden']
if any(s in value for s in suspicious_indicators):
report += f" SUSPICIOUS: {entry.get('name', 'N/A')} -> {entry.get('value', '')[:100]}\n"
with open('/cases/case-2024-001/analysis/persistence_report.txt', 'w') as f:
f.write(report)
print(report)
PYEOF
Key Concepts
| Concept | Description |
|---|---|
| Run keys | Registry keys executing programs at user logon (HKLM and HKCU) |
| Scheduled tasks | Windows Task Scheduler entries that execute on triggers (time, event, logon) |
| WMI event subscriptions | Persistent WMI queries that trigger actions (stealthy persistence) |
| COM hijacking | Redirecting COM object loading to execute malicious DLLs |
| DLL search order hijacking | Placing malicious DLLs in directories searched before System32 |
| Service persistence | Installing Windows services that auto-start with the system |
| Boot-level persistence | Modifying boot configuration or MBR/VBR for pre-OS execution |
| Living-off-the-land | Using legitimate system tools (PowerShell, WMI, certutil) for persistence |
Tools & Systems
| Tool | Purpose |
|---|---|
| Autoruns | Sysinternals comprehensive autostart enumeration tool |
| RegRipper | Automated registry persistence artifact extraction |
| KAPE | Automated persistence artifact collection and analysis |
| Velociraptor | Endpoint agent with persistence hunting artifacts |
| OSQuery | SQL-based system querying for persistence enumeration |
| PersistenceSniper | PowerShell tool for Windows persistence detection |
| RECmd | Eric Zimmerman registry command-line analysis tool |
| Volatility | Memory forensics for in-memory only persistence |
Common Scenarios
Scenario 1: APT Persistence After Initial Compromise
Check all registry Run keys, enumerate scheduled tasks for encoded PowerShell commands, examine WMI event subscriptions for event-triggered execution, check COM object registrations for hijacked CLSIDs, review services for recently installed entries with suspicious image paths.
Scenario 2: Ransomware Pre-Encryption Persistence
Identify how the ransomware maintains access for re-encryption or monitoring, check for scheduled tasks that would re-launch encryption, examine services installed by the ransomware operator, verify no additional backdoor persistence exists before declaring remediation complete.
Scenario 3: Fileless Malware Persistence
Focus on registry-based persistence storing payload in registry values, check WMI subscriptions executing PowerShell from event triggers, examine scheduled tasks using encoded command arguments, check for mshta/rundll32 based persistence loading remote content.
Scenario 4: Post-Remediation Verification
Run Autoruns comparison against known-good baseline, verify all identified persistence mechanisms have been removed, check for additional persistence that may have been missed, confirm services, tasks, and registry entries are clean, monitor for re-infection indicators.
Output Format
Persistence Investigation Summary:
System: DESKTOP-ABC123 (Windows 10 Pro)
Analysis Date: 2024-01-20
Persistence Mechanisms Found:
Registry Run Keys (HKLM): 5 entries (1 SUSPICIOUS)
Registry Run Keys (HKCU): 3 entries (1 SUSPICIOUS)
Services (Auto-Start): 142 entries (2 SUSPICIOUS)
Scheduled Tasks: 67 entries (3 SUSPICIOUS)
WMI Subscriptions: 1 entry (SUSPICIOUS)
Startup Folder: 4 items (1 SUSPICIOUS)
COM Objects: 0 hijacked entries
DLL Hijacking: 0 detected
Suspicious Entries:
1. HKCU\Run\WindowsUpdate -> powershell -ep bypass -e <base64>
Timestamp: 2024-01-15 14:35:00
Action: Encoded PowerShell download cradle
2. Service: WinDefenderUpdate -> C:\ProgramData\svc\update.exe
Timestamp: 2024-01-15 14:40:00
Action: Unknown executable in ProgramData
3. Task: \Microsoft\Windows\Maintenance\SecurityUpdate
Command: cmd.exe /c powershell -w hidden -e <base64>
Trigger: On system startup
4. WMI: __EventFilter "ProcessStart" -> CommandLineEventConsumer
Action: Execute C:\Windows\Temp\svc.exe on WMI event
Remediation Required: 4 persistence mechanisms to remove
Report: /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/persistence_report.txt
Verification Criteria
Confirm successful execution by validating:
- [ ] All prerequisite tools and access requirements are satisfied
- [ ] Each workflow step completed without errors
- [ ] Output matches expected format and contains expected data
- [ ] No security warnings or misconfigurations detected
- [ ] Results are documented and evidence is preserved for audit
Compliance Framework Mapping
This skill supports compliance evidence collection across multiple frameworks:
- SOC 2: CC7.3 (Incident Identification), CC7.4 (Incident Response)
- ISO 27001: A.16.1 (Security Incident Management), A.12.4 (Logging)
- NIST 800-53: AU-6 (Audit Review), IR-4 (Incident Handling), AU-9 (Audit Protection)
- NIST CSF: RS.AN (Analysis), RS.RP (Response Planning)
Claw GRC Tip: When this skill is executed by a registered agent, compliance evidence is automatically captured and mapped to the relevant controls in your active frameworks.
Deploying This Skill with Claw GRC
Agent Execution
Register this skill with your Claw GRC agent for automated execution:
# Install via CLI
npx claw-grc skills add performing-malware-persistence-investigation
# Or load dynamically via MCP
grc.load_skill("performing-malware-persistence-investigation")
Audit Trail Integration
When executed through Claw GRC, every step of this skill generates tamper-evident audit records:
- SHA-256 chain hashing ensures no step can be modified after execution
- Evidence artifacts (configs, scan results, logs) are automatically attached to relevant controls
- Trust score impact — successful execution increases your agent's trust score
Continuous Compliance
Schedule this skill for recurring execution to maintain continuous compliance posture. Claw GRC monitors for drift and alerts when re-execution is needed.